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BARNETTE'S BIG BLUNDER
STEVEN D. SMITH*

And or or? Or or and? A lot can turn on the choice of a wordof a 2-letter or a 3-letter conjunction. Justice Robert Jackson (or I
suppose it might have been a law clerk, or conceivably even a careless
secretary or printer) opted for the 2-letter conjunction-and thereby
committed the Court (and the judges and lawyers and scholars, and
indeed the nation) to a course of massive collective delusion, and to a
constitutional discourse reflecting and perpetuating that delusion.
"If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation....
The case was West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,1 and

Jackson, assigned to write the majority opinion, was already on the
home stretch. The substance was already delivered, the outcome and
supporting rationale clearly indicated. Jackson likely did not suspect
that he was on the verge of writing what was destined to figure among
the dozen or so most quoted and revered passages to appear in a
Supreme Court opinion-words that would be praised as "eloquent
and epochal," "among the great paeans to human liberty," "a ringing
endorsement of religious freedom," "haunting," and "among the most
eloquent pronouncements ever on First Amendment freedoms."' 2 He
may have written casually, carelessly, guided less by sober calculation
than by the poetic muse that spoke through Jackson in more than one
of his opinions. Who really knows?
What we can know is what he wrote. "If there is any fixed star in
our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion.. ."-and or or? or or and?-"... can
prescribe what shall be orthodox, or force citizens to confess by word
* Warren Distinguished Professor, University of San Diego School of Law. I thank Larry
Alexander, Nicole Garnett, Andy Koppelman, Bob Nagel, Michael Perry, and Mark Rosen for
helpful comments on an earlier draft. I also benefited, of course, from commentary at the
conference, and especially from Professor Shiffrin's response.
1. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
2. The quotations, from Leo Pfeffer, John Noonan, Glendon Schubert, Rodney Smolla,
and Rodney Smolla again, are collected in Jay S. Bybee, Common Ground: Robert Jackson,
Antonin Scalia, and a Power Theory of the First Amendment, 75 TUL. L. REV. 251, 255 n.15,261

(2000).
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or act their faith therein." Or. So with regard to orthodoxy (a term
that derives from Greek and means "right opinion"3), the state cannot
either "prescribe" or "force." Or at least, so says Barnette.
Either conjunction would have served Jackson's immediate purposes. Either would have supported the conclusion, that is, that West
Virginia could not compel Jehovah's Witnesses to recite the Pledge of
Allegiance contrary to their beliefs. And would have worked.
Indeed, and would have been more faithful to the overall position
taken by the Court. After all, the Court was not suggesting that a
state is somehow forbidden to conduct Pledge exercises in public
schools and to encourage student participation. If the Pledge expressed a sort of terse orthodoxy (and unless Jackson was merely
pontificating on matters irrelevant to the case, he must have thought
that it did), and if articulating, endorsing, and officially sponsoring the
Pledge amounted to "prescrib[ing]" it, then the Barnette Court was
not in fact forbidding prescription in the case itself; it ruled only that
the state could not force unwilling students to participate. (The
discrepancy between what the Court said the state could not do and
what it allowed the state to do already foreshadowed the incoherence
that would come to plague First Amendment jurisprudence.)
But Jackson chose to say "or"-and, as another poetic Robert
put it, "that has made all the difference. ' We can imagine a jurisprudence that candidly acknowledges the reality and necessity of public
pronouncements affirming, endorsing-yes, "prescrib[ing]"-what is
taken at a given time to be "right opinion," and that accordingly
focuses on respecting pluralism and protecting conscience by developing rationales and devices for tolerating opinions that deviate from
the orthodoxies of the day. But we do not have that sort of ruggedly
honest jurisprudence. Instead, we have a jurisprudence of subterfuges and elusive (or illusory) distinctions -one that requires us to
pretend, at least episodically, that in the realm of belief, government
cannot and therefore does not prescribe-does not officially stand
for-any "right opinions." Large, labyrinthine discourses concerned
with freedom of speech and religion have evolved in the effort to
maintain that pretense.
I myself am indulging in some poetic license here, of course, or at
least in some professorial hyperbole. For one thing, Jackson's

3. PAUL TILLICH, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN THOUGHT 305 (1968).
4. Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken (1915).
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Barnette opinion (like First Amendment doctrine generally) is
susceptible to more than one interpretation-including more benign
interpretations. And if courts and commentators were to converge in
giving the case a more sensible construction- and were to do so
consistently rather than sporadically and opportunistically -I would
happily withdraw my criticisms. Some such development is after all
what the author of an essay like this one dreams of (but does not
seriously expect).
In addition, we cannot know-and it may seem implausible to assume-that a single judicial opinion, and a single word in that opinion, could alone have had such momentous consequences. It is more
sensible, perhaps, to suppose that Jackson was merely expressing, in
his inimitable way, a position that was already available and that
would have been influential in any case. I concede the point, but add
two cautionary observations.
First, Jackson's resounding rhetoric in Barnette may have had
more influence than this objection supposes. Small causes can
produce large effects. "For want of a nail .... " Borrowing from
Pascal, we might call this the "Cleopatra's nose" effect.' Jackson did
not invent the "no orthodoxy" position; but in the Darwinian struggle
among competing views, a particularly enticing expression of one
view might give it a competitive advantage over other views that have
been articulated in cruder or clumsier form. That advantage might
make a large difference. Who knows?
But, second and more importantly, it does not matter much
whether Jackson's Barnette opinion has been directly responsible for
the sort of First Amendment jurisprudence that has unfolded in
recent decades. I have no personal grudge against Robert Jackson.
He was, as far as I know, an honorable man. For those of us who
work in law, life would be more rewarding if more justices could write
with his insight and flair. This Essay argues that the "no orthodoxy"
position memorably articulated in Barnette has had a beguiling but
baneful influence on our First Amendment discourses -and hence on
our understanding of our community, and of ourselves. Barnette
serves at least as a potent symbol or eloquent enunciation of that illconceived understanding. But whether Barnette itself is the principal

5. "Cleopatra's nose: if it had been shorter the whole [face] of the earth would have been
different." BLAISE PASCAL, PENSEES § II, annotation 162, 202 (W.F. Trotter trans., Robert
Maynard Hutchins et al. eds., William Benton 1980).
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culprit or merely a glib spokesperson for a more diffuse set of culprits
is not finally of much importance.
My argument, in sum, is that our constitutional discourse would
be more cogent and candid and our self-conception more honest and
healthy if Barnette's disjunctive formulation and all it entails were
removed-"root and branch," as the saying goes-and replaced by a
conjunctive formulation. The exhilarating rhetoric could be retained
and embraced-and a fruitful discourse and honest selfunderstanding permitted (though not, of course, guaranteed) -with
the amendment of only one word. An and for an or.
Section I briefly discusses the meaning and scope of Barnette's
"no orthodoxy" position. Section II considers different though
related ways in which the position is internally incoherent, practically
untenable, and wholly inconsistent with the way government has
operated, does operate, and will continue to operate in this or any
other country. Section III considers five ways in which the "no
orthodoxy" position is sometimes qualified-or might be qualifiedin response to these difficulties, but argues that even so qualified the
position is not viable.
The arguments and criticisms considered in these sections are
neither novel nor especially insightful; on the contrary, they have
been made before in various forms and contexts, and they are at least
close to being obvious. Nonetheless, the objections seem to have no
"sticking power." Why? Section IV considers, and criticizes, a
familiar defense measure-what we might call the "plea of necessity" -sometimes adopted by the disciples of Barnette in an (so far
successful) effort to fend off the obvious. I argue that this plea is
misconceived and also, as Section V suggests, that the necessity is
illusory.
There is an alternative to the delusional discourse inspired by
Barnette. We could change a word. We could adopt the conjunctive
formulation in place of the disjunctive formulation. An and for an or.
I.

THE CONSTITUTION OF BARNETTE

Justice Jackson left no doubt that the constitutional commitment
he was describing was not peripheral-not merely one commitment
among many. The commitment was at-or simply was- the enduring
core of our constitutional self-understanding. "If there is any fixed
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star in our constitutional constellation. . . ." If our constitution stands

for anything, Jackson suggested, this is it.
And what is that "fixed star" - that core constitutional commitment? Taken at face value, the Barnette passage articulates a commitment consisting of two prohibitions. First, government may not
"prescribe" what is orthodox in the realms of politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion. Second, government may not
"force" citizens to "confess" any such orthodoxy.
These prohibitions are dramatically different in their scope. By
itself, the second prohibition would amount to a sort of "no coerced
professions of belief" or "no enforced orthodoxy" position. This
position would resonate with, say, Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion
in Lee v. Weisman,6 the graduation prayer case. By contrast, the first
prohibition-on "prescribing" beliefs-appears to be much broader,
amounting to a general position eschewing any official or public
orthodoxy (enforced or not).
To be sure, the meaning of "prescribe" is not perfectly clear. We
may be tempted, in an effort to confine the scope of Barnette, to read
"prescribe" narrowly. One way to do this would be to distinguish
between "affirming" or "endorsing" a particular belief, on the one
hand, and "prescribing" it, on the other. If I say "I believe all persons
are of equal moral worth," I affirm that proposition, maybe; but in
order to prescribe the proposition perhaps I need to add "and you
should believe it too."
But this limiting distinction is at least elusive and probably illusory. That is because, to put the point simply, to say you believe
something is to assert that you believe it is true; and to assert that
something is true is necessarily to assert-or at least to imply-that
other people who are interested in believing the truth should believe
it too. Hence, to affirm something is necessarily to prescribe it, at
least implicitly. (We will look at the possible distinction between
"implicit" and "explicit" prescriptions later.)
To be sure, in our relativistic and truculently tolerant times we
have grown accustomed to insisting that something can be "true for
me" but not necessarily "true for you," and vice versa. This usage
presents complicated questions and equivocations that we cannot try
to work through here. For present purposes it is enough to say that
although the "true for me, not for you" ploy may sometimes serve a
6. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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valuable diplomatic function,7 it cannot maintain its integrity in the
face of close reflection. Take the most promising case-what we
sometimes call "matters of taste." Suppose Dick says, "Strawberries
taste better than raspberries." Surely that sort of statement can be
"true" for Dick but not for Jane, can't it? But a charitable assessment
will show, I think, that unless Dick means to assert something that is
either nonsensical (such as that strawberries just have an "objective
taste" that is not a taste to anyone) or manifestly false (such as that
everyone in the world likes strawberries better than raspberries), then
he is in fact saying, basically, that he prefers strawberries to raspber-

ries. And that proposition -namely, that "Dick prefers strawberries
to raspberries" - will be equally true (or false) for both Dick and
Jane-and for everyone else. So even here, in a "matter of taste," to

affirm that proposition is necessarily to affirm it as true-and hence
to recommend it for acceptance by anyone who is interested in the
truth.
A different way to narrow Barnette's "no prescription" prohibition would be to read the passage's "or" as if it were an "and": so
prescription of belief would be forbidden only if coupled with coercion. We could accomplish a similar result by interpreting "pre-

scribe" to mean not just any form of governmental sponsorship or
endorsement of belief, but only sponsorship or affirmation backed by

some sort of coercive pressure. Understood in one of these ways,
Barnette would mean that government may endorse or promote
favored beliefs so long as no undue pressure is put on citizens to go

along.8

7. Such talk may sometimes serve a diplomatic function because, as Professor Shiffrin
correctly points out, there can be a difference between "logical entailment" and "social
meaning." In a related vein, I have elsewhere discussed and acknowledged the diplomatic use
of the conceptually problematic vocabulary of "equality" and "neutrality" in the context of
religion. See STEVEN D. SMITH, GETTING OVER EQUALITY: A CRITICAL DIAGNOSIS OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA 22-25 (2001). But it also needs to be acknowledged, I
think, that this distinction is a slippery one that can serve to permit an insulating self-deception
(by those who explicitly or tacitly rely on it) as easily as it can be used to promote legitimate
diplomacy. For example, if I understand his comments at the conference correctly (and I may
not), Shiffrin believes that when the state (through its schools) teaches evolution, this teaching
does not in its "social meaning" disapprove a six-day creationist view even though such
disapproval is "logically entailed" by the state's teachings. Hmm.... It is evident here that the
notion of "social meaning" is distracting someone from fully appreciating what is logically
entailed by the state's teachings, but whom: is it the creationists, whose views are disapproved
(but only as a matter of "logical entailment," not "social meaning"), or is it the proponents of
the public school curriculum .... or perhaps someone else? See also infra notes 51, 68.
8. Other readings are also possible, of course. For example, any sort of governmental
endorsement might be construed as a subtle form of compulsion: Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion in Lee v. Weisman might gesture in this direction. This interpretive move would in
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This sort of construction would be consistent with what the Court
did in Barnette: as noted, the Court did not actually proscribe school-

sponsored Pledge exercises, but merely forbade the state to force
unwilling students to participate. In addition, a good deal of what

Jackson wrote in the opinion-including his statement of the question 9 and his repeated references to and condemnations of coercion or

compulsion in matters of belief1°-might be cited in favor of some
such narrower construction. Whether Jackson actually intended this
narrower construction is unclear, however, in part because he de-

picted the alternative that was permitted-that is, school-sponsored
Pledge exercises from which conscientious objectors would be excused-as "patriotic ceremonies [that] are voluntary and spontaneous[.]" 11' It is as if school children were just spontaneously and wholly
of their own volition congregating around the flag each morning to
12
recite the Pledge. As the school prayer decisions later recognized,
this depiction of a school-sponsored daily exercise seems manifestly
unrealistic, and it muddies the question of whether officially pre-

scribed ceremonies should be viewed as inconsistent with the position
announced in Barnette. Still, whatever Jackson's intent may have
been, Barnette could be read more narrowly.
But the language of Barnette resists these narrowing constructions. The passage says "or"-not "and"-thus suggesting two
related but still independent prohibitions. Conversely, interpreting
"prescribe" to mean something like "prescribe coercively" renders
the phrase introduced by the "or" redundant.
Read in its most natural sense, in sum, Barnette declares two
prohibitions. Government cannot force us to confess any "right
effect inflate the "no coercion" prohibition to make it coextensive with the "no prescription"
prohibition. In that sense, it moves in the opposite direction from the interpretations mentioned
above in the text, which effectively collapse the "no prescription" prohibition into the "no
coercion" prohibition.
9. "The question which underlies the flag salute controversy is whether such a ceremony
so touching matters of opinion and political attitude may be imposed upon the individual by
official authority .... " W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 635-36 (1943) (emphasis
added).
10. See, e.g., id. at 631 ("... we are dealing with a compulsion of students to declare a
belief"), ("a compulsory salute"); id. at 632 ("... attendance is not optional"); id. at 633 ("It is
also to be noted that the compulsory flag salute and pledge requires affirmation of a belief.. "), ("involuntary affirmation"); id. at 634 ("the compulsory flag salute"); id. at 640 ("The
problem is whether under our Constitution compulsion as here employed is a permissible
means .. "); id. at 641 ("attempts to compel coherence"), ("coercive elimination of dissent"),
("[clompulsory unification of opinion... .
11. Id. at 641.
12. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1962).
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opinions." But beyond that, government cannot prescribe any "right
opinions." And this broader proscription logically covers official
affirmations and endorsements of particular opinions.
In reality, as we will see, this natural interpretation of Barnette
has not been-and indeed could not be-consistently implemented.

Often (as in Barnette itself) the courts, and other governmental
institutions, have acted in a way more consistent with a narrower
reading. Professor Shiffrin points out-correctly, I think-that no
one can really believe and subscribe to the full scope of Barnette, and

therefore almost no one does. 13 In practice, judges or scholars may
use the Barnette "no orthodoxy" passage opportunisticallybrandishing the idea to dispatch orthodoxies they disapprove of, but

sheathing it when a more congenial "right opinion" comes along. Or
they may hold-in fact this seems to be a common view-that
Barnette applies with full force in the realm of religion, but that
outside the religious domain only the "no coercion" prohibition
applies. With respect to religious beliefs, that is, government may

neither "force" nor "prescribe," but with respect to nonreligious
'14
opinions government may "prescribe" but not "coerce.
We will consider this "religion-specific" rendering of Barnette

more closely later. 5 For now, two observations are in order. First,
Barnette itself does not so limit its scope. On the contrary, Barnette
asserts that government is forbidden to "prescribe what shall be
orthodox" not only in religion, but "in politics, nationalism, religion,
or other matters of opinion." And Justice Jackson went out of his way
to make clear that the decision did not depend on the fact that the
Jehovah's Witnesses had a religious objection to participating in the
6
Pledge.1

13. Steven H. Shiffrin, Liberalism and the Establishment Clause, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 717
(2003).
14. Thus, an early school prayer case ruled that it was not enough for public schools to
avoid coercing students to participate in prayer; the schools had to forego the exercise
altogether. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,430-31 (1962). More generally, modem establishment
doctrine holds that government must be "neutral" in matters of religion, and that government
can neither speak nor act in ways that send messages (coercive or not) endorsing or disapproving of religion. Conversely, free speech doctrine forbids government to coerce professions of
belief but does not preclude government officials, "high or petty," from throwing their support
behind particular beliefs.
15. See infra Section III.E.
16. "Nor does the issue as we see it turn on one's possession of particular religious
views.... While religion supplies appellee's motive for enduring the discomforts of making the
issue in this case, many citizens who do not share these religious views hold such a compulsory
rite to infringe constitutional liberty of the individual." Barnette,319 U.S. at 634-35.
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Second, even as they adopt a "religion-specific" version of the
"no orthodoxy" or "no prescription" prohibition, both courts and
scholars commonly offer rationales that subvert the distinction
between "religious" and "nonreligious" prescriptions and point to a
broader application of Barnette-one more consistent with what the
case itself explicitly said. Thus, by contrast to older free speech
doctrines that used balancing or category tests mainly to prevent
coercive restrictions on expression, modern free speech doctrine has
come to be dominated by the ideal of content neutrality. Under this
newer jurisprudence, regulatory "content distinctions" are presumptively dubious, and "viewpoint-based restrictions ... are almost
automatically unconstitutional."' 7 And the rationale commonly given
for this doctrine is that government must not "skew public discourse"
by throwing its weight behind one side in a contested matter. 8 But
this rationale suggests that Barnette's "no prescription" prohibition
should not be limited to religion. After all, if government throws its
considerable weight behind one side in a controversy (even in a
noncoercive fashion), isn't such prescription likely to "skew" the
debate? 9
By the same token, the rationale commonly given for prohibiting
prescriptions in the area of religion makes it difficult to explain why
that prohibition should be confined to religion. Explaining the
modern "no endorsement of religion" doctrine, justices have emphasized that government actions or utterances either endorsing or
disapproving of any religion might cause some citizens to become
alienated, or to feel like "outsiders" or "second-class citizens" - and
on the basis of beliefs that they have a constitutional right to hold.20
But this phenomenon is hardly limited to religion. Citizens care
deeply about matters of belief that would not typically be classified as
"religious" and that they have a constitutional right to hold, and they
may be alienated if they perceive government to be taking a position
contrary to these central beliefs.

17. CAss R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 13 (1993); see
also Kent Greenawalt, Viewpoints from Olympus, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 697, 698 (1996).
18. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 895-96
(1995) (Souter, J., dissenting); Elena Kagan, The ChangingFace of First Amendment Neutrality:
R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Rust v. Sullivan, and the Problem of Content-Based Underinclusion, 1992
Sup. Cr. REV. 29, 67; Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-NeutralRestrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 55
(1987).
19. See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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So it is too simple to say without qualification that Barnette's

prohibition on "prescrib[ing] what shall be orthodox" is limited to
religion. We can say, perhaps, that this prohibition is most secure in
the field of religion, where indeed it is widely taken as axiomatic, or
as the one certainty in a notoriously chaotic jurisprudence.

Thus,

Andrew Koppelman argues that in the midst of raging controversies
about the meaning of religious freedom it is nonetheless a secure

''axiom" that the "Establishment Clause forbids the state from
declaring religious truth."21 Kent Greenawalt concurs that "[t]he core
idea that the government may not make determinations of religious
truth is firmly entrenched," and Greenawalt himself heartily approves
of that idea. 22 Not only the clear language of Barnette itself, but also

the rationales commonly offered in support of modern doctrines in
both the religion and free speech areas, suggest a more general "no

prescription" prohibition. 23
Consequently, the following discussion will first examine the
"wide" interpretation of Barnette before proceeding to consider the

more religion-specific version.

21. Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 108 (2002).
22. Kent Greenawalt, Five Questions about Religion Judges Are Afraid to Ask, in
OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF FAITH 196, 197 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed.
2000); see also Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: the Equal Status of
Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1986) ("In my view, the
establishment clause absolutely disables the government from taking a position for or against
religion.... The government must have no opinion because it is not the government's role to
have an opinion."). Michael Perry elaborates on the theme:
No matter how much some persons might prefer one or more religions, government
may not take any action based on the view that the preferred religion or religions are,
as religion, better along one or another dimension of value than one or more other
religions or than no religion at all. So, for example, government may not take any
action based on the view that Christianity, or Roman Catholicism, or the Fifth Street
Baptist Church, is, as a religion or church, closer to the truth than one or more other
religions or churches or than no religion at all-or, if not necessarily closer to the
truth, at least a more authentic reflection of the religious history and culture of the
American people.... Similarly, no matter how much some persons might prefer one
or more religious practices, government may not take any action based on the view
that the preferred practice or practices are, as religions practice . . . , better-truer or
more efficacious spiritually, for example, or more authentically American-than one
or more other religious or nonreligious practices or than no religious practice at all.
MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION INPOLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES 15
(1997).
23. Consistent with this logic, many First Amendment scholars talk as if the Amendment
contains a "no orthodoxy" or "anti-orthodoxy" principle not limited to religion, though few if
any of these scholars appear to be committed to the full implications of that view. See, e.g.,
OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 37, 40 (1996); William P. Marshall, In Defense of
the Search for Truth as a First Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1995); Jed
Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's Purpose,53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 818-22 (2001).
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II. BARNETTE'S SOOTHING DELUSION
Barnette's "no orthodoxy" position has achieved widespread acceptance among both justices and scholars, and its appeal is readily
understandable. For government as for the rest of us, taking sides on
controversial issues can be difficult and unpleasant. We are aware of
our fallibility. And especially if the issue is passionately contested, we
are likely to alienate those who disagree. So for many purposes, it
would indeed be wonderful if we-if government-could simply
avoid these difficulties-could maintain a position dispassionately
above the fray.
Unfortunately, the "no orthodoxy" position is also embarrassed
by several closely related objections. To begin with, the "no orthodoxy" principle is internally contradictory. And it demands what is
impossible. Far from being a "fixed star in our constitutional constellation," the principle is in fact radically incongruent with our constitutional traditions. Finally, real compliance with the principle, even if it
were possible and not wholly contrary to our traditions, would likely
be injurious or even devastating to the political community. These
are hardly trivial objections, so we need to look at them a bit more
closely.
Barnette's "no orthodoxy" passage is self-contradictory because
the passage itself comprises a sort of mini-orthodoxy, or a prescription of what shall be orthodox in an important "matter of opinion"
centrally affecting "politics" and law (and "religion," and probably
"nationalism" as well). It is not foreordained, after all, that government officials must avoid prescribing what beliefs are favored within
the subject matter categories listed in Barnette. Governments have
often issued such prescriptions-indeed, as we will notice shortly,
governments in this country have issued and continue to issue such
prescriptions routinely-and many people have believed that governments should so prescribe. Barnette flatly declares these "proprescription" beliefs to be not orthodox-not "right opinion"-and it
declares the contrary view to be the constitutional orthodoxy; indeed,
Barnette's phrase "fixed star" is little more than a metaphorical
equivalent for "orthodoxy." In this respect, Barnette's "'no orthodoxy' orthodoxy" contradicts itself; it is like the pastor who repeatedly declares during worship that there must be absolutely no talking,
or like the sign on the school wall that says no signs are permitted on
the wall.
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This embarrassment may seem to be more a conceptual curiosity
than a substantial objection-one that can be cured with the help of a
24
small exception: there shall be no official orthodoxy except this one.

But a second objection is more practical and less easily dismissed.
This objection argues that the anti-orthodoxy principle asks the
impossible, because government inevitably will endorse and in that
sense prescribe some beliefs, and will explicitly or tacitly disapprove

of other beliefs.
Sometimes the endorsement will be merely implicit. Whenever

government acts-by passing a law, by declaring a policy-it acts on
the basis of factual beliefs about how the world is and of normative
beliefs about how the world should be (and on the basis of rejecting
factual and normative beliefs contrary to those it accepts and acts
upon); and government thereby at least tacitly endorses some beliefs

and rejects others. Andrew Koppelman observes that "[t]he most
obvious way in which the government expresses an opinion is through
the passage of legislation. In this arena, the government has available

to it a particularly powerful type of symbolic conduct that is unavail-

25
able to other actors."
Often, though, the prescriptions are more overt. Governments
and their agents will often issue official statements, or official preambles or explanations, or will sponsor informational campaigns or
teaching. Thus, there was no question during much of the last century
that governments in this country were for capitalism and against
communism, for democracy and against totalitarian regimes, for
abstinence from and against addiction to drugs and tobacco. Governments tried in a whole variety of ways to approve certain beliefs
(for democracy, for free market economics, for drug and tobacco
abstinence) and to induce citizens to accept those beliefs.
24. Of course, such exceptions (of the "I forbid everyone except myself to do X" variety),
though they may overcome the charge of formal inconsistency, do little to deflect more
substantive suspicions of inconsistency. ("If you think X is so bad, why is there an exception for
you?")
25. Koppelman, supra note 21, at 111. Koppelman illustrates his point:
Suppose a statute is passed that makes it a crime for anyone to break the commandment to obey the Sabbath, as the commandment is understood by Orthodox Jews.
That is, the law makes it a felony to operate machinery on the Sabbath, to drive a car,
to turn on an electric appliance, or to make a telephone call, and the law applies to
private as well as public conduct, so that one can violate it by turning on the television
while one is alone at home. There is no substantive constitutional right to do any of
these things. The problem with this law lies in the message it contains: It implicitly
asserts the correctness of the commandment to keep the Sabbath holy and the Orthodox rabbis' interpretation of that sentence.
Id. at 111-12.
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Probably the most obvious and pervasive prescription of belief
occurs in the context that generated Barnette itself-that is, in public
schools. Under the insistent tutelage of the Supreme Court, for
example, schools typically teach children to understand and accept
the tenets of evolution, and the schools avoid (or are supposed to
avoid) teaching "creationism" to children. 26 And of course the public
schools teach or "prescribe" what shall be "orthodox" or "right
opinion" on a whole host of other (often controversial) matters as
well. Justice Jackson was able to hide (at least from himself) the huge
discrepancy between the "no orthodoxy" position he announced and
the reality of public education only by depicting the school curriculum
in quite fantastic (though by now fairly standard) terms-as "not...
partisan or enemy of any class, creed, party, or faction."27 In this
respect, Justice Frankfurter's dissent was more honest in recognizing
that the state does attempt, through its schools, to inculcate controversial orthodoxies in a variety of matters. 28
If these various pronouncements and measures are not ways of
"prescrib[ing] what shall be orthodox" in matters of opinion, then it is
not clear what content that phrase might have. This sort of prescription of belief, it seems, is inevitable: it is a central part of what government does. A government must act, and hence it must act on
some set of beliefs: so government could hardly avoid endorsing the

26. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968).
27. W. Va. Bd. Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
28. See id. at 659-60 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted):
Consider the controversial issue of compulsory Bible-reading in public schools. The
educational policies of the states are in great conflict over this.... The requirement of
Bible-reading has been justified by various state courts as an appropriate means of
inculcating ethical precepts and familiarizing pupils with the most lasting expression of
great English educational literature. Is this Court to overthrow such variant state
educational policies by denying states the right to entertain such convictions in regard
to their school systems because of a belief that the King James version is in fact a
sectarian text to which parents of the Catholic and Jewish faiths and of some Protestant persuasions may rightly object to having their children exposed? On the other
hand the religious consciences of some parents may rebel at the absence of any Biblereading in the schools. Or is this Court to enter the old controversy between science
and religion by unduly defining the limits within which a state may experiment with its
school curricula? The religious consciences of some parents may be offended by subjecting their children to the Biblical account of creation, while another state may offend parents by prohibiting a teaching a biology that contradicts such Biblical account.
What of conscientious objections to what is devoutly felt by parents to be the poisoning of impressionable minds of children by chauvinistic teaching of history? This is
very far from a fanciful suggestion for in the belief of many thoughtful people nationalism is the seed-bed of war.
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beliefs it acts upon. 29 Nor will government's prescription of beliefs be
limited to this sort of tacit endorsement-unless, that is, we want
government not only to get out of the business of public education
but, more radically, to cease giving explanations of its decisions. It is
hard even to imagine what such a world would look like-executive
orders without explanations, statutes enacted without committee
reports or preambles or findings, judicial decisions that strictly
confine themselves to terse decrees such as "Plaintiff loses" or
"Judgment reversed." We can be confident that no such world is in
the offing-which is to say that the "no orthodoxy" position is not
one that government will or could adhere to, even approximately.
So it is not surprising that in our history, governments in this
country have routinely violated the anti-orthodoxy principle on a
massive scale, and they continue to do so. Given this reality, the
notion-one that, as noted, has become the core of modern free
speech jurisprudence-that government must not regulate speech on
the basis of content in order to avoid "skewing public debate" seems
almost laughable. 30 The argument here does not necessarily imply
that the "content neutrality" focus of modern free speech doctrine is
misguided-only that the "no skewing" rationale commonly given for
that doctrine is wildly out of touch with reality.3 Sanford Levinson
describes the incongruity:
This image of the state as... benignly neutral.., is quite naive, not
least because it almost wholly fails to pay adequate attention to the
fact that the state is often an active participant in the intellectual
marketplace. The easiest examples, of course, involve presidents
giving major policy addresses or teachers using state-mandated
29. Nor could government avoid this consequence by simply refusing ever to act, because
passivity itself will be consistent with one set of beliefs and not with others: a government that
adopts an 4ggressively passive laissez faire stance toward issues of economic regulation, for
example, does not thereby avoid endorsing some controversial economic and political views
over others.
30. Larry Alexander notices the conundrum:
When government becomes an educator or patron of scholarship, research, and the
arts, its tension with the First Amendment's central values is most acute. If the government may not establish an evaluative orthodoxy regarding citizens' exchanges of
information, why may it do so when it speaks itself, as it does through public education, the funding of research, scholarship, the arts, public broadcasting, family planning
counseling, and myriad other enterprises? ... Why the government may monetarily
subsidize speech that promotes live birth over abortion but may not subsidize labor
speech by granting an exemption from a general ban on demonstrations near schools is
a theoretical mystery.
Larry Alexander, Freedom of Expression as Human Right, in PROTECTiNG HUMAN RIGHTS:
INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS (Tom Campbell et al. eds., forthcoming 2003).
31 See Abner S. Greene, Government Speech on Unsettled Issues, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
1667, 1679-85 (2001).
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textbooks within the public school system. Both regularly articulate, clothed in the full symbolic and actual authority of the state,
highly contestable-and completely unneutral-views on important
political and cultural matters. The danger facing those who disagree with the state's views comes, most often, not from any plausible fear of classic censorship-i.e., overt punishment for offering
views repugnant to state authorities-but, rather, from being
drowned3out
of the marketplace by the often superior resources of
2
the state.
Nor has this governmental practice of endorsing and promoting
particular beliefs over others-and in this significant sense "prescrib[ing] what shall be orthodox"-been viewed as merely an unfortunate necessity. On the contrary, many of the most revered events
and chapters in our constitutional tradition have resulted directly
from this practice, and indeed consist of just such "prescriptions."
What were Jefferson's Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, or the
Declaration of Independence, or Lincoln's Gettysburg and Second
Inaugural addresses, or the Fourteenth Amendment (which was
designed and has been celebrated for its rhetorical value as well as for
its positivist legal content33), or John Kennedy's Inaugural Addressor, for that matter, the "no orthodoxy" passage in Barnette itself-if
not officially issued endorsements of what were taken to be important
truths, and thus were recommended to citizens (and others) for
acceptance as the "right opinion" -the orthodoxy?
Given this history, John Courtney Murray came closer to capturing our constitutional tradition than Justice Jackson did. Murray
observed that our constitutional order-or what he called "the
American Proposition" rests on the... conviction that there are truths; that they can be
known; that they must be held; for, if they are not held, assented to,
consented to, worked into the texture of institutions, there can be
no hope of founding a true City, in which men may dwell in dignity,
peace, unity, justice, well-being, freedom. 34
These are weighty objections to Barnette's "no orthodoxy" declaration; I confess that I do not see how the declaration can survive
them (though we will look at some standard rejoinders and defenses

32. SANFORD LEVINSON, WRITrEN IN STONE: PUBLIC MONUMENTS IN CHANGING
SOCIETIES 79-80 (1998).

33. William Nelson suggests that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment understood it
"as a rhetorical venture designed to persuade people to do good, rather than a bureaucratic
venture intended to establish precise legal rules and enforcement mechanisms." WILLIAM E.
NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 9 (1988).

34. JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS ix (1960).
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shortly). Suppose, though, that these objections could somehow be
deflected-that government could somehow carry on its business
without ever expressing its official support for one set of controversial
beliefs over others, and that we were willing to disregard any tradition-based reasons that might favor such endorsement. Would it be
wise henceforth to shun any official prescriptions favoring some
beliefs?
We have already noticed one powerful rationale favoring a policy of governmental silence in matters of belief: any governmental
endorsement or prescription runs the risk of alienating those citizens
whose beliefs are incongruent with the position favored by government. But there is a competing (and, to my mind, overriding) consideration, which might be presented in this way: the concern about
alienating some citizens already presupposes something that people
might be alienated from. More specifically, the concern presupposes
a political community represented by a government that is more or
less securely in place, and hence that enjoys at least some degree of
allegiance from the broad mass of citizens. Academics in particular
often seem remarkably complacent in taking that community and
secure government for granted, as if these things were somehow given
by nature. But of course a quick glance around the world should be
enough to show that stable government supported by broad citizen
allegiance is not guaranteed. So what is the basis of the general
allegiance necessary to a secure government?
The answer is complex, no doubt, but at least part of the answer
surely is that most citizens suppose that the government stands for
certain beliefs that they and their fellow citizens share. If government
were suddenly to adopt a stance of standoffish agnosticism toward
these beliefs, therefore, it is true that citizens who happen to reject
those beliefs would have less cause to feel alienated; but, conversely,
the citizenry in general would have less reason to give their loyalty to
the government in the first place.
These assertions raise complicated questions, obviously. One
view, common today, sees people largely as "interest-seekers": for
example, public choice theory and evolutionary psychology (both
increasingly popular among law professors), adopt this conception of
the person.35 By this view, perhaps, citizens support government not
35. For a discussion, see Steven D. Smith, Believing Persons, Personal Believings: The
Neglected Center of the First Amendment, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1234 [hereinafter Smith,
Believing Persons].
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so much because it stands for beliefs they share, but rather because
(and insofar as) it promotes their "interests." One version of this
approach suggests that our own political community has persisted and
flourished not so much on the basis of any shared commitment to
fundamental propositions, such as the "self-evident truths" of the
Declaration of Independence, but rather because we have managed
to devise institutions and policies that have promoted a successful
commercial republic. In this vein, defending the Supreme Court's
rejection of free exercise exemptions in Employment Division v.
Smith, 36 George Will argued that the framers "wished to tame and

domesticate religious passions of the sort that convulsed Europe.
They aimed to do so... by establishing a commercial republiccapitalism. They aimed to submerge people's turbulent energies in
self-interested pursuit of material comforts."37
More generally, a good deal of modern liberal theory-John
Rawls's theorizing is a leading example- attempts to separate the
constitution of the political community from (and to insulate it
against) claims about truth. "Political liberalism's preferred strategy," Jody Kraus explains, "is to substitute the idea of reasonableness
' Critics argue that the modern liberal aversion to truth
for truth."38
claims is self-defeating, culminating in a "Nietzschean self-dissolution
of enlightenment. ' 39 Be that as it may, Barnette's resonance with this
truth-coy strain of modern liberalism may help account for the
opinion's remarkable popularity.
My own view, by contrast, is that what makes us persons-and
the particular persons we are-is not so much our "interests" as our
central, constitutive beliefs, and that a community that neglects or
ignores this dimension of our personhood will have at best a weak
claim on our respect. I have argued at length for this view elsewhere;40 for now, it is enough to say that if something like this view is
right, then it would be imprudent- indeed, potentially devastatingfor the political community to eschew official declarations of belief on
matters of importance, even though those declarations will be contro36. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
37. Stanley Hauerwas & Michael Baxter, The Kingship of Christ: Why Freedom of "Belief'
is Not Enough, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 107, 108 (1992) (quoting George Will).
38. Jody S. Kraus, Political Liberalism and Truth, 5 LEGAL THEORY 45, 55 (1999). I
discuss this liberal retreat from truth claims in Steven D. Smith, Recovering (from) Enlightenment?, (forthcoming) [hereinafter Smith, Enlightenment].
39. VITrORIO HOSLE, OBJECTIVE IDEALISM, ETHICS, AND POLITICS 44 (1998).
40. See Smith, Believing Persons, supra note 35.
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versial. A republic that stands for something may indeed alienate
those who disagree, but a republic that stands for nothing will have no
claim on anyone's allegiance.
Evidence of this danger may already be apparent in the changed
tactics and attitudes that some conservative Christian groups have
adopted in recent years. Kathleen Brady reports that "[t]he triumphalist effort of the 1980's to convert and reclaim American culture
has ended"; instead, there is a "growing belief among conservative
religious groups that religion is best promoted and protected through
private expression and activity rather than through state action in the
public realm. ' 41 If Brady is right, these developments presumably
ought to be gratifying to proponents of the "no orthodoxy" position.
But Brady also notes that this altered agenda signifies a sort of
withdrawal from the public realm. "[JI]nstead of battling for the
reform of public education," she observes, "many conservative
Christians are looking towards a solution in private religious schools
and home-schooling." And "[i]n politics as well, conservative Chris"42
tians have been withdrawing ....
This phenomenon of withdrawal should not be surprising. If a
politician is unwilling to affirm what you believe, you will probably
not vote for her or donate time or money to her campaign. In the
same way, if a political community disdains to commit itself to truths
that citizens think important, those citizens will naturally have less
reason to commit themselves to the community.
In sum, for all of its initial appeal (at least if we are thinking narrowly about the potential for alienation), the "no orthodoxy" position
is self-contradictory, impossible to implement, and radically incongruent with the way governments in this and other countries have
behaved or could behave; and it is very likely subversive of the
political community as well.
How then has the position managed to maintain such widespread
support?

41. Kathleen A. Brady, The Push to Private Religious Expression: Are We Missing
Something?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1147, 1156, 1158-59 (2002).
42. Id. at 1157-58.

BARNETTE'S BIG BLUNDER

20031

III. RETURN TO REALITY? CONFINING THE "No ORTHODOXY"
POSITION

At least part of the answer is that the understanding of Barnette's
"no orthodoxy" position has incorporated, at least tacitly, qualifications and distinctions that are calculated to make the position more
viable without compromising its basic prohibition on governmental
prescription of belief. In this section we will notice five possible
distinctions that might be and sometimes are employed (though often
subtly or perhaps even subconsciously) to qualify the "no orthodoxy"
position. I will argue that none of these distinctions succeeds in
salvaging the "no orthodoxy" position or in deflecting the objections
discussed in the preceding section.
A.

Public and PrivatePrescriptions

The first qualification explains that the prohibition on prescribing what shall be orthodox applies only to government; hence, private
individuals are perfectly free to declare their beliefs to be orthodox,
or the "right opinion," as are persons who happen to be government
officials so long as they are not acting as officials. Supplementing
Barnette, we might say that the prohibition on prescribing what shall
be orthodox applies to "officials, high or petty, when they are acting as
officials." Some such qualification is suggested by current First
Amendment jurisprudence: free speech doctrines seek to prevent
discrimination against the private expression of anyone's views on the
basis of content, even if the content is religious, 43 while establishment
doctrine forbids government to send messages endorsing or disapproving of religion. 44
Though much in our law turns on the so-called public/private distinction, that distinction is hardly serviceable for the purpose of
maintaining Barnette's prohibition on "prescrib[ing] what shall be
orthodox" as against the objections noted earlier. One criticism,
recall, asserts that every law, every governmental decision, every
43. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Rosenberger v.
Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
44. For some scholars and jurists, this combination of speech and religion doctrines is the
response of choice to the question of "religion in the public square." See, e.g., Douglas Laycock,
Freedom of Speech That Is Both Religious and Political,29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 793 (1996);
Laycock, supra note 22; see also Kathleen A. Brady, Fostering Harmony Among the Justices:
How Contemporary Debates in Theology Can Help to Reconcile the Divisions on the Court
Regarding Religious Expression by the State, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 433, 554-59 (1999).
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policy (including, most conspicuously, the decisions and policies that
shape and implement the public school curriculum) reflects-and
thereby at least tacitly endorses, and hence "prescribes"-the set of
beliefs that provides the reason for the decision, law, or policy (and
the rejection of contrary beliefs). It is no answer to this objection to
say that the officials who make those decisions or policies hold the
supporting beliefs as private individuals, but that government does not
thereby endorse the beliefs. Government is not some Platonic
abstraction, after all, or some ghostly superentity with a mind and
beliefs of its own; it is composed of persons, who do not come bifurcated into public and private dimensions. Or even if they were so
bifurcated, it is precisely the beliefs that animate their public decisions and actions that are in question.
Not surprisingly, therefore, even so qualified the "no orthodoxy"
position remains radically inconsistent with the way government has
operated in this country, and with the way it continues to operate.
Are we to suppose, for example, that the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, when it declared coercion to be inconsistent with the
plan of "Almighty God" and "the holy Author of our religion," was
merely expressing the private opinions of Jefferson and Madison? Or
that the solemn affirmations of the Declaration of Independence are
no more than an expression of Jefferson's (and other signatories')
personal views? Perhaps, with effort, we can imagine that Lincoln
was speaking as a private citizen when he delivered the Gettysburg
Address-he was a noted orator, perhaps, invited for the occasion,
who incidentally happened to be president-but any such characterization defies plausibility with respect to his monumental Second
Inaugural Address. Lincoln was, after all, being reinaugurated as
president. It would be similarly fantastic to describe the affirmations
of the Fourteenth Amendment-or the majority opinion in
Barnette-asmere private expressions.
In short, our constitutional tradition is importantly composed of
public affirmations of important truths. And on a more mundane
level, when teachers in the public school system teach the approved
curriculum-when they teach, say, evolution but not creationism (or,
subversively, vice versa) -they are surely speaking as public employees; if they were not, then there should be no constitutional objection
to their proselytizing on behalf of their religious opinions. 45
45. I have argued here that clarifying Barnette's prohibition to make clear that it applies
only to governmental prescriptions of opinion does nothing to avoid the objections asserting that
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For all of its usefulness in some contexts, the public/private distinction usually has a fictional aspect to it. Fictions sometimes serve a
useful purpose in law. In this context, though, the fiction is utterly
transparent-too transparent to preserve the pretense required by the
"no orthodoxy" position.
B.

Explicit vs. Implicit Prescriptions

A different (and probably more controversial) qualification
might suggest that Barnette means only that government cannot
explicitly prescribe what shall be orthodox in matters of opinion;
implicit endorsements are permissible. In this vein, Franklin Gamwell concedes that government simply cannot avoid implicitly taking
positions on what he calls "the comprehensive question" or the
question of "human authenticity as such." For example, "teaching
constitutional or statutory prohibitions of racism more or less obvi46
ously implies that a religious assertion of white supremacy is false."
Even so, Gamwell argues, government is constitutionally forbidden to
take any position on these questions explicitly.4 7 In a similar spirit,
Kent Greenawalt argues that in some contexts government officials
may rely on religious or other controversial grounds in making
decisions but should avoid expressing those grounds in their public
48
justifications.
This qualification seeks to deflect the objection that every governmental decision or action will necessarily convey approval of some
beliefs and disapproval of others: the qualification in effect concedes
the objection but attempts to mitigate its force by confining the
prohibition to explicit approvals and disapprovals. But limiting the
Barnette prohibition to explicit prescriptions does not avoid the
embarrassments noted earlier. In the first place, as noted earlier, it is
the position is impossible of implementation and seriously at odds with our traditions and
current practices. It can be observed more briefly that the clarification does nothing to negate
the other objections either. The argument that Barnette's"no orthodoxy" position is incoherent
and self-contradictory because the position itself is an orthodoxy remains in force because the
passage is plainly an official pronouncement, not merely an expression of Robert Jackson's
personal views. And the objection which asserts that citizens' allegiance depends importantly
on their perception that government stands for what they regard as true and central beliefs is
also unaffected by the clarification, because it seems that in order to elicit allegiance to
government, or to the political community, a belief would need to be seen as a belief of
government or the political community.
46. FRANKLIN I. GAMWELL, THE MEANING OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 193 (1995).
47. Id. at 185-95.
48.

See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 137-39,

155-56 (1995).
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hard to imagine a world in which government manages to act without
explicitly affirming the beliefs on which it acts, at least in many
instances. And in any case, such an image is less a pleasant fantasy
than a nightmare, because such a government-one which acts and
decides without articulating the reasons for its actions and decisionswould be contrary to the ideals of openness and public rationality that
have been so strenuously cultivated during our history (in due process
jurisprudence, for example, or in administrative law).
The "no explicit orthodoxy" position also remains radically incongruent with both our constitutional tradition and our current
practice. For example, all of the expressions noted above-the
Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, the Declaration of Independence, the Gettysburg Address, the Fourteenth Amendment, and
the Barnette "no orthodoxy" passage-were plainly explicit affirmations, not implicit ones. The same is true, obviously, of the teachings
contained in the public school curriculum.
More generally, the proposed distinction between explicit and
implicit prescriptions is too delicate to do useful work in this context.
"Explicit" and "implicit" do not denote distinctly marked categories.
Suppose we are forced to choose between alternatives A and B (Bush
or Gore, perhaps), and you say, "Choose A": Is your disapproval of B
explicit or merely implicit? Given these alternatives, is there any real
difference (or, if we are concerned about "social meaning," will there
be any perceived difference) between saying "Choose A" and saying
"Choose A, not B"? Or, to borrow Gamwell's example, if the government teaches that racial discrimination is wrong, is the obvious
corollary that groups who advocate racial discrimination are wrong
on the issue an explicit or merely an implicit part of that teaching? If
a science teacher tells the class that life on earth evolved gradually
over millions of years, he clearly indicates that living things didn't
appear suddenly in their present form within a six-day period: is this
rejection of the six-day theory explicit or implicit?
Imagine the teacher who, accused by fundamentalist parents of
having taught the falsity of their religious beliefs, protests, "I said the
process took hundreds of millions of years, yes; but I never said it
wasn't completed in six days. Don't put words in my mouth." Imagine how we would react to this defense. "What do you take us for?
Imbeciles?"
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More importantly, it is hard to imagine why anything of constitutional significance should hinge on this subtle distinction. 49 The courts

have not been fooled-and have not cared about the distinctionwhen an implicit message advocates religion, for example ("We said

'creation,' but we didn't actually say 'God'"); 0 and it is hard to see
why they should care. Gamwell admits that an implicit message will

sometimes be "more or less obvious"; consequently, an implicit but
obvious disapproval of someone's beliefs is likely to produce exactly
the same kind of alienation that an explicit disapproval would.

Sometimes, of course, an "implicit" message might be less alienating.5' But then sometimes it might be more alienating (because it
might appear insidious or surreptitious). Religious parents, for
example, might feel that if the public schools are going to teach ideas

contrary to the faith their children have learned at home or at church,
the schools should be upfront about what they are teaching rather

than subtly subvert the children's faith while purporting to be "neutral" and "objective" in matters of religion.52 And in any case, the
pertinent distinction for these purposes would not be "explicit/implicit," but rather something like "perceptible/imperceptible," or perhaps "offensive/inoffensive."
In sum, the explicit/implicit distinction is an elusive one that has
no status in our constitutional traditions and little or nothing to
recommend it as a constitutional boundary regulating what the

government can and cannot say and do.

49. Cf Koppelman, supra note 21, at 110-11 ("It is a familiar point in free speech law that
conduct which is not itself speech may nonetheless communicate a message and so be appropriately treated as speech.... If government cannot declare religious truth, then it cannot engage
in conduct the meaning of which is a declaration of religious truth.").
50. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 590-93 (1987).
51. In this respect, I accept Professor Shiffrin's observation that there can be a difference
between "logical entailment" and "social meaning"-which is to say that the meaning that
different observers in different contexts will perceive in a message will not be coextensive with
the message's logical implications-but I doubt that this distinction can do the work that Shiffrin
hopes it can. See supra note 7; infra note 68.
52. See, e.g., Graham Walker, Illusory Pluralism, Inexorable Establishment, in OBLIGATIONS OF CMIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF FAITH 111, 121 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed. 2000):
After all, if I am in a minority position, I would rather possess my religious identity in
the face of a majority religious order overtly at odds with me-so long as my subordinate existence is constitutionally ensured-than to stand in the midst of a scheme
whose mask of neutrality will strip my identity from me-or from my childrenwithout our even realizing it.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

C.

[Vol178:625

"Consensus" vs. "Sectarian" Prescriptions

A third, Rawlsian-inspired distinction,5 3 might try to differentiate
between beliefs that are supported by a "consensus" of diverselyminded citizens and, conversely, beliefs that are "sectarian" -a

species of opinion to which Enlightenment liberalism has always been

hostile14 By this view, government should be permitted to teach and

"prescribe" views supported by a democratic consensus; the prohibition on "prescrib[ing] what shall be orthodox" would be limited to
"'sectarian" views.
An initial and obvious challenge for this proposal is to define
what counts as a "consensus" opinion. In ordinary usage, "consensus" seems to be a numerical notion, or a matter of counting noses: a
"consensus" opinion is one that a majority of citizens, or perhaps
nearly all citizens, would agree with. So government could prescribe

opinions that most citizens hold. But this numerical approach seems
radically alien to the essential spirit of Barnette, which sought self-

consciously to protect minority views from just this sort of majoritarian imposition."
A more promising approach would understand "consensus" as a
term of art, meaning something like "reachable by more than one
route," or "held by different citizens on different kinds of grounds."

In a Rawlsian scheme, for example, the "overlapping consensus" is
not necessarily one that enjoys majority support-Rawls seems
blissfully unconcerned about how many citizens actually embrace the
"overlapping consensus" he celebrates-but rather one that citizens

might converge on from a variety of different (though emphatically
not all) "comprehensive views. '56

53. In saying that this distinction is "Rawlsian-inspired," I do not claim to be offering a
correct interpretation of Rawls's own position. Hopelessly hazardous claims should be avoided
where possible. Cf Paul J. Weithman, Citizenship, Reflective Endorsement and Political
Autonomy, 78 MOD. SCHOOLMAN 135 (2001) (observing that "[m]uch of Rawls's exposition and
argument is extremely puzzling. The anomalies multiply when some of his more recent remarks
in 'Public Reason Revisited' are juxtaposed with some of his earlier ones in Political Liberalism.").
54. See, e.g., Stephen Macedo, In Defense of Liberal Public Reason: Are Slavery and
Abortion Hard Cases?, in NATURAL LAW AND PUBLIC REASON 11, 25 (Robert P. George &
Christopher Wolfe eds. 2000); see also Smith, Enlightenment, supra note 38.
55. See, e.g., W. Va. Bd. Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) ("The very purpose of
a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to
place them beyond the reach of majorities ...").
56. See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133-72 (1993).
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Thus understood, the distinction between "consensus" and "sectarian" views offers an initially promising prospect for rehabilitating
Barnette's "no orthodoxy" position. The crucial claim might assert
that "consensus" opinions, because they presumptively reflect a
variety of different substantive positions, are not an "orthodoxy" per
se so much as a sort of common meeting place. This claim then
suggests a way of deflecting all of the criticisms noted in the preceding
section. First, insofar as different citizens might subscribe to the "no
orthodoxy" position itself on a variety of different grounds, that
position would not count as an "orthodoxy," so the charge of internal
contradiction would be answered. In the same way, the argument
that government necessarily endorses and acts upon beliefs while
rejecting other beliefs could be deflected. Although it is true, that is,
that government acts upon and endorses beliefs of various kinds, so
long as those beliefs are held by different citizens on different
grounds, they are not "sectarian" and hence are not a forbidden
"orthodoxy." Likewise, although the Declaration of Independence,
the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, the Gettysburg Address,
and other such celebrated pronouncements may come to us dripping
with solemn affirmations of belief, those beliefs are perhaps not an
"orthodoxy" in the offensive sense.57 Finally, by limiting itself to
prescribing beliefs supported by a consensus, government adopts a
course calculated to elicit the allegiance of citizens of a variety of
different views.
So, does this construction salvage Barnette's "no orthodoxy" position, rendering it consistent with the practices and demands of
government? The construction surely identifies an important political
and prudential consideration-one that has operated powerfully
throughout our history to secure stability and loyalty from a diverse
citizenry. Governments in this country have often striven - and
politicians have an obvious incentive-to be as inclusive and "nonsectarian" as circumstances permit. 8 Taken as an interpretation of
Barnette, however, or as a construction of a constitutionalprohibition

57. The same conclusion would seem to hold for the Pledge of Allegiance itself, however,
which surely enlists the support of differently-minded citizens on different grounds. The Pledge,
in other words, would seem to be more a "consensus" type of statement than a "sectarian"
one,... and hence not an "orthodoxy" (by this interpretation),.., and hence not within the
scope of Barnette's prohibitions. Thus, adoption of this interpretation of Barnette might entail
overruling the actual decision in the case.
58. See, e.g., Noah Feldman, Nonsectarianism, 18 J.L. & POL. 65 (2002); Smith, Believing
Persons,supra note 5.
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on "prescrib[ing] what shall be orthodox," this consensus proposal
comes to look like little more than a piece of trickery, or semantic
sleight of hand.
After all, beliefs and belief-systems do not come nicely sorted
into those that can be reached through a variety of different routes
and, conversely, those that can be supported only from a single
position and hence are "sectarian." Take, as an example, Christianity. Although it may be rhetorically useful for some purposes to
depict "Christianity" as a monolithic position, this depiction seriously
distorts the historical reality. "Christianity" in this country plainly
encompasses Catholics, Protestants, and Orthodox believers, with the
inclusion of some other groups-Mormons, for instance-generating
more controversy. And this description still simplifies drastically,
because there are huge differences-theological, ethical, aesthetic,
cultural, and political-among different sorts of Catholics, and
perhaps even larger differences among different species of Protestants. Some Christians cherish and defend, while others spurn,
creedal statements of belief; those who favor creeds often disagree as
to the contents. In addition, Christians differ tremendously in what
we might call the epistemological and existential routes they take to
arrive at a "Christian" outlook. Some have credited the various
philosophical or "rationalist" arguments developed over the centuries
by the likes of Anselm and Aquinas. Others have rested more on
scripture and tradition,... or institutional authority,.., or personal
spiritual experience. A few may embrace the sort of thinking developed by Pascal, who suggested that Christianity is more faithful than
competing views to what we know about the human condition, with
its paradoxical combination of implicit dignity and visible degradation. And there are surely people-millions of them, possibly-who
embrace Christianity in some form or another mostly for its thisworldly (one might even say "secular") benefits in providing community and guidance, 9 for example, and who may even be agnostic or
59. The "secular" commitment to Christianity has deep roots in this nation's history. Philip
Hamburger notes that in the founding period, "late eighteenth-century establishment writers...
stressed that civil government financed religion for civil ends-that religion had civil benefits,
which civil government supported for its purely civil purposes." Hamburger describes this as a
"secular argument" for religious establishment. PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF
CHURCH AND STATE 67 (2002). Dissenters accepted the premise, though not the conclusion.
"More substantively, [the dissenters] agreed with establishment writers that religion and
especially the religion of their country provided an essential moral basis for government .. "
Id. at 73. As Hamburger's study shows, this theme has been pervasive (though often controversial) throughout the country's history.
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apathetic regarding the theological content of traditional Christianity.
Amid all of these differences, the monolithic depiction of "Christianity" looks farfetched; indeed, it is very hard to say whether there is
any common core that gives coherent meaning or scope to a term like
"Christianity," or what that common core is. 6°
These variations in no way undermine the value of political efforts to be as inclusive or "nonsectarian" as varying circumstances
permit. But for those who favor a constitutional prohibition on
governmental prescription of "orthodoxy" (now understood to be
limited to "sectarian" or monolithic positions), such complexity
creates a dilemma. Suppose that government issues a proclamation,
for example, asserting that "Christianity is the favored religion in this
country. We are a 'Christian Nation."' Does this proclamation
offend the "no orthodoxy" prohibition?
One answer, accepting in good faith the view that "orthodoxy"
occurs only when a belief represents only "one position" or can be
arrived at in only one way, would conclude that "Christianity" is not
an "orthodoxy"-far from it. (And this conclusion would hold a
fortiori for "theism"-as in the phrase "one nation, under God"which could encompass not only Christianity but also Judaism, Islam,
and various other faiths.) But this conclusion surely would be unacceptable to supporters of Barnette in any plausible version. More
generally, if Barnette prohibits the prescription and enforcement only
of monolithic views that can be reached by only one route, then it
prohibits precious little (if anything).
But the practical alternative, it would seem, is to use the terms
"consensus," "sectarian," and "orthodoxy" in a more ad hoc and
intuitive fashion, labeling "sectarian" those positions that (however
arrived at by their adherents) seem inappropriate for public prescription, while arguing that those positions one favors for such prescription are not "orthodoxies" but rather reflections of an "overlapping
consensus." "Christianity" may be at least as theologically and
epistemically and culturally and politically diverse as "liberal democracy"; nonetheless, Barnette's devotees somehow know that a "Christian Nation" proclamation would be "sectarian" and, conversely, that
teaching the ostensible tenets of "liberal democracy" is merely
prescribing what is supported by a "consensus."

60. For a recent study highlighting many of the variations on a global level, see PHILIP
JENKINS, THE NEXT CHRISTENDOM, ch. 6 (2002).
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This more rhetorical deployment of notions like "consensus" is
familiar enough: just spend a few hours reading Rawls or like-minded
theorists. 61 And perhaps the rhetoric provides some sense of comfort,
or of self-satisfaction, for those who use the rhetoric in this way and
who already share the conclusions that are being argued for. But it is
hard to perceive any other advantages-much less any theoretical
justification-for this manipulative use of the notion of "consensus."
D.

"Negative" vs. "Positive" Prescriptions

A fourth way of qualifying the Barnette "no orthodoxy" position
might suggest that although government may not prescribe what shall
be "orthodox," or "right opinion," government is permitted to
prescribe what shall not be "orthodox." Barnette, in other words,
might be understood as prohibiting positive prescriptions of belief
while allowing what we might call "negative" prescriptions of belief.
This sort of distinction might serve to excuse some common public
teachings ("Don't do drugs." "Don't smoke." "Don't commit
violence." "Communism is bad."): government isn't "prescribing" in
a positive sense, we might say, so much as it is "prescribing against."
This qualification of Barnette's "no orthodoxy" position, like the
previous one, might at first inspection seem attractive because
"negative" prescriptions seemingly would leave citizens free to decide
what they do believe, and would merely encourage them not to accept
certain disfavored opinions. Consequently, some theorists occasionally appear to invoke something like this positive/negative distinction. 62 But I am not aware of any sustained defense of this
qualification. And the omission is not surprising, because upon
consideration this distinction has little to recommend it.
The main difficulty with this position is that the distinction between "negative" and "positive" prescriptions is illusory. As a logical
matter, "not not-p" equals "p." Hence, any prescription of belief can
be phrased in either positive or negative terms: "God exists" and
"Atheism is false" are substantially equivalent propositions. And
historically, from the early Christian period through the medieval
inquisition through modern "Red Scare" persecutions through antievolution laws like the one struck down in Epperson v. Arkansas,63
61. For further discussion, see Smith, Enlightenment, supra note 38.
62. See, e.g., infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
63. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
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the suppression of opinion has often been carried out through "negative" prescription-that is, through the identification and attempted
elimination of "heresy" or perceived error.
Moreover, even if the distinction were conceptually viable, the

rationales for the "no orthodoxy" position would not support it.
Telling citizens that a belief they hold is false is as likely to produce
alienation, or a sense of "second-class" status, as is an affirmation of a
contrary belief. Conversely, "positive" prescriptions might leave

citizens as much or more space to decide what they actually believe as
"negative" prescriptions would. "Theism is true" (or "one nation,
under God") is logically and practically compatible with a much
broader range of views than, say, "Anti-trinitarian views are not true"

is. Despite its initial appeal, in short, a qualification based on an
ostensible distinction between "positive" and "negative" prescrip-

tions, or between "prescribing" and "prescribing against," does
nothing to deflect the objections to the "no orthodoxy" position.
E.

Religious vs. Secular Prescriptions

A fifth qualification of Barnette's "no orthodoxy" position would
apply the Barnette prohibition on prescription only to religious beliefs
or opinions. As discussed earlier, Barnette itself does not limit its

prohibition in this way, but rather describes its scope as "politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion." Nonetheless,
courts and scholars, fortified perhaps by the fact that the First
Amendment contains a clause specifically disestablishing religion,"
have often supposed that the prohibition applies largely or solely to
religious prescriptions.
So, can Barnette, thus truncated, avoid the objections to a "no or-

thodoxy" position discussed above? We might start with an obvious
point: even when limited to religious prescriptions, the "no ortho-

doxy" position runs contrary to our constitutional traditions and
64. The exact connection between a religion-specific Barnette prohibition and the fact of a
clause disestablishing religion is loose and complicated. It would be hard to argue, I think, that
the framers of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause consciously intended to create this
sort of prohibition, see STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 17-54 (1995), nor does the text itself
mandate such a construction. There are plenty of other (at least equally plausible) constructions. For example, the provision might easily be read to support Barnette's prohibition on
coercion but not the prohibition on prescription. But such is the nature of constitutional
argument: the clause is there, we suppose, so we have to make it mean something of consequence (unless, of course, it is the Third Amendment, or the Contracts Clause, or... ), and thus
we obtain license to make it mean what we would like it to mean.
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current practice, because governments in this country have repeatedly
prescribed "what shall be orthodox," or "right opinion," in matters of
religion. Indeed, many of the leading examples discussed aboveincluding the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, the Declaration
of Independence, and Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address-contain
explicit affirmations of specific religious beliefs. For example, Lincoln's speech contained, within the space of twenty-five sentences,
"fourteen references to God, many scriptural allusions, and four
direct quotations from the Bible. '65 And government continues to
issue such affirmations: in the national motto ("In God We Trust"), in
presidential addresses, and in various other ways.
But of course there are good traditions and bad traditions; "separationists" often argue that this longstanding practice of religious
affirmations is a bad tradition that we ought to repent of. So what
about the other objections to the "no orthodoxy" position? 66 I have
argued above, for example, that government necessarily endorses
beliefs in a variety of contexts, and hence that a "no orthodoxy"
position asks what is impossible. Is this criticism avoided if we
stipulate that it is only religious belief that government cannot
prescribe?
The religion-specific construction of Barnette necessarily assumes, of course, that it is possible to define "religion" with sufficient
clarity to permit reliable judgments about which prescribed beliefs
are "religious" and which are not. This assumption is hardly a secure
one-it might be argued, in fact, that it is untenable 67-but for present
purposes let us set this problem aside. There is, I think, a deeper
difficulty afflicting the religion-specific construction of Barnette. The
difficulty is that this construction necessarily depends on one or more
of the distinctions that we have just considered-the distinctions
between "explicit" and "implicit" prescriptions, "consensus" and
"sectarian" prescriptions, and "positive" and "negative" prescriptions-and that I have argued to be illusory or unworkable.

65. ELTON TRUEBLOOD, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: THEOLOGIAN OF AMERICAN ANGUISH

135-37 (1973).
66. Though the point might be argued, I will assume for present purposes that a religionspecific prohibition on prescription avoids the criticism that asserts that such a prohibition is
self-contradictory by virtue of being itself a prescription of orthodoxy.
67. For one thoughtful attempt to address the constitutional problems of defining
"religion," see Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. REV.
753 (1984). For my own more skeptical take, see Steven D. Smith, The "Secular," the "Religious," and the "Moral": What Are We Talking About?, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 487 (2001).
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To see how this is so, we can once again consider what may be
the starkest ongoing example of the conflict of opinions in the public
sphere-that is, the teaching of Darwinian evolution as part of the
school curriculum. Though the subject is obviously controversial, for
present purposes let us quickly concede all contested issues in favor
of the proponents of evolution, and of teaching evolution in the
public schools. So let us assume, at least for purposes of argument,
that the scientific evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates Darwinian
evolution, that Darwinism is not itself a "religion" but is also not
intrinsically incompatible with "religion," and that the proponents of
Darwinism as part of the curriculum are not in fact motivated by a
desire either to promote or discredit "religion." The fact remains that
Darwinian theory is incompatible with beliefs held and taught by
some religions-religions embraced, it seems, by millions of American citizens. And the inescapable implication of this fact is that by
teaching evolution, the public schools teach that the relevant beliefs
held by those religions and their adherents are false. In that sense, it
would seem, the schools prescribe an orthodoxy, or a "right opinion":
they prescribe that the right opinion is to reject the pertinent religious
6
beliefs of, for example, biblical literalists and six-day creationists. 8
How then can the teaching of evolution be squared with even a
religion-specific construction of Barnette? It seems that the practice
might be (and typically is, if often only tacitly) defended by invoking
one of the distinctions discussed above. Though it is true that a
biology curriculum that includes Darwinism will contradict the
teachings of some religions, we might suggest that the condemnation
will be merely implicit: science teachers will not explicitly say (though
they may believe) that the six-day theory is preposterous. Or we
might say that Darwinian evolution is supported by a "consensus"not only atheists but also many religionists can accept it-while
creationism is a "sectarian" belief. Or we might argue that evolution

68. Professor Shiffrin's emphasis on the distinction between "logical entailment" and
"social meaning" seems to have been directed in opposition to this conclusion. I acknowledge
the distinction, and also acknowledge that it may indeed be significant for some purposes. See
supra notes 7, 51. But if the claim is that evolution (and the teaching of evolution in the public
schools), though logically incompatible with the biblical literalist view of creation, is nonetheless
not in its "social meaning" popularlyperceived as opposing such religious beliefs, then I can only
say that in view of the long history of the evolution-creationism contest from the Scopes trial
through Edwards v. Aguillard, through more current controversies in places like Kansas, that
claim seems to me (as the Supreme Court sometimes says) "remarkable." Cf Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 48 (1985) (describing as "remarkable" the lower court's conclusion that the
Constitution does not forbid a state to establish a religion).
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as taught is in effect a sort of "negative" prescription-it implies that
certain views, such as six-day creationism, are wrong-but does not
positively prescribe among an array of intellectual options: the
orthodox Darwinism of Richard Dawkins, say, or the "punctuated
equilibrium" version of Stephen Jay Gould, or the providentially
"guided evolution" that many religious believers gravitate toward. So
students are still free to make up their own minds among those
alternatives. (And of course they can also defy the prescription and
believe in six-day creationism anyway.)
We can say any or all of these things, and they might be worth
saying in certain contexts and for certain purposes. The point for now
is simply that we cannot escape invoking these distinctions by turning
to a different qualification and saying that Barnette is limited to
religious prescriptions. If we are to explain why teaching Darwinism
is consistent with Barnette, in other words, we cannot merely invoke a
distinction between "religion" and "nonreligion"; we will need to
resort to these other distinctions as well. But all of these distinctions
are spurious or at least highly elusive, as we have seen, and they do
not lose their dubious character just because "religion" is involved.
Consequently, if Barnette's more general "no orthodoxy" position
was not viable even with the aid of these dubious qualifications, it will
not become viable by being limited to the domain of "religion."
Nor is this conclusion limited to the evolution-creationism controversy, or to the situation in which public employees (school
teachers) undeniably teach a theory or set of beliefs that is plainly
inconsistent with some religious views. In reality, the school curriculum implicates a whole range of religious issues; it is not just biology
classes that speak to religious issues, but also classes in health, home
economics, social studies, literature, and general reading. Many of
these conflicts in which the curriculum "prescribes against" an array
of religious opinions might be surprising to most citizens-and even
more surprising to most law professors (whose experience in this
realm is likely to be quite limited 69). But if you want to get a taste of
the wide-ranging impact of the curriculum on the religious beliefs
69. See Douglas Laycock, Continuity and Change in the Threat to Religious Liberty: The
Reformation Era and the Late Twentieth Century, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1047, 1078-79 (1996):
1 have never heard a colleague, at any of the three law schools where I have taught,
make a religious claim in an academic context. When the student chapter of the Christian Legal Society at [t]he University of Texas needed a speaker, I knew of only three
or four church-attending colleagues on a faculty of sixty-five, none in the evangelical
mode the students were seeking.
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held by some citizens, it should be enough to read the opinions in
Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education7 ° or Smith v. Board of
School Commissioners of Mobile County.71
Moreover, the public school curriculum is merely the scene of
the most explicit public teachings implicating religious beliefs. In
reality, virtually every action taken by government at least tacitly
teaches, if not the truth, then the falsity of some religious beliefs. A
colleague points out to me that even a law prohibiting murder implicitly teaches the falsity of the Aztec belief in human sacrifice.7 2 In
short, it seems likely that every governmental action, every public
decision, every law reflects some sort of orthodoxy and thereby at
least implicitly rejects contrary orthodoxies (at least some of which
will be religious in nature). Consequently, the religion-specific
construction of Barnette still pervasively depends on the dubious
distinctions criticized earlier.
Finally, we should notice that the qualified, religion-specific "no
orthodoxy" position does not avoid the final objection discussed in
the previous section-the objection, that is, which asserts that even if
it were possible for the political community to remain noncommittal
on matters of belief, the result of such a policy would be to undermine
loyalty to that community. Indeed, this objection may apply a fortiori
to the religion-specific position. Though the matter is complex, our
history clearly shows that the allegiance of many citizens (certainly
not all) is grounded in their belief that this is "one nation, under
God," as the Pledge of Allegiance says (except perhaps in the Ninth
Circuit). 73 A similar understanding is conveyed by the national motto,
"In God We Trust." In case anyone thinks the point is controversial,
I simply incorporate by reference Robert Bellah's seminal work on

70. 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
71. 655 F. Supp. 939 (S.D. Ala. 1987), rev'd, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987).
72. I owe the example to Andy Koppelman who, I should say, offered it as a reductio ad
absurdum of the kind of argument I am making here. For my part, I readily acknowledge the
absurdity, and merely point out that this absurd implication follows not from my argument but
from the "no orthodoxy" prohibition.
73. See Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002). In the Pledge itself, as is
often noted, these words are only about a half-century old. That fact has no obvious implications for my argument here, but it may be worth pointing out that although additions to a
received text can be made for the purpose of changing its meaning, they can also be made for
the purpose of reaffirming or perhaps clarifying something that was long thought to be
understood but that has more recently been called into question. In any case, associations of
religion with the central meaning of the republic surely go back to the founding and colonial
periods. See infra note 74.
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"civil religion. ' 74 A religion-specific "no orthodoxy" position, if it
were in fact maintainable, would not only forfeit this ground of
allegiance: by insisting that among all of the families of contestable
beliefs it is only religious beliefs that are automatically and a priori
disqualified from participating in a public orthodoxy, the qualified
position might well be more repugnant to citizens of this mind than a
more general "no orthodoxy" position would be.
F.

The Rhetoric of Obfuscation

The previous section argued that the "no orthodoxy" position is
inconsistent with the way governments in this country have traditionally operated and must operate. This section has considered five
distinctions that might be and sometimes are invoked to clarify or
qualify the "no orthodoxy" position in an effort to deflect those
objections. Though some of these distinctions do identify legitimate
public considerations, I have argued that none of them succeeds in
salvaging Barnette or in explaining how government has respected or
could possibly respect a prohibition on "prescrib[ing] what shall be
orthodox."
When employed for this purpose, however, those distinctions do
serve to sponsor an intricate discourse in which inconsistencies can be
conveniently lost. Thus, we begin with what looks like a categorical
prohibition. "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation," we declare with gusto, "it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
" We repeat the mantra when particular
other matters of opinion....

disfavored practices-school prayer, or perhaps the words "under
God" in the Pledge of Allegiance-come before our view. "If there is
any fixed star. ... " Then some nonconforming practices that we are

loathe to relinquish (like the public school curriculum) present
themselves, and we hasten to explain that what we meant was that no
official acting as an official can explicitly prescribe in a positive way

sectarian beliefs in matters of religion. But if officials prescribe beliefs
in their private capacity, or if their prescriptions are merely implicit,
or limited to matters supported by a "consensus" (properly understood as a term of art, of course, not a crude matter of counting
noses), or negative rather than positive in character, or concerned
74. See, e.g., Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, in BEYOND BELIEF: ESSAYS ON
RELIGION IN A POST-TRADITIONALIST WORLD 168 (1970).
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with beliefs that are not "religious" (a term that conveniently defies
clear definition) ...well, of course those sorts of "prescriptions" (if
anyone is so indelicate as to describe them under that heading) are an
entirely different matter.
This supple rhetoric-composed of a broad categorical prohibition redirected and qualified by a host of protean distinctions-makes
it possible, depending on our inclination, to say that just about
anything government does or says either is or is not in violation of
Barnette: clear cases, if there are any, are mostly relegated to law
professors' hypotheticals. That supreme flexibility may make the
rhetoric issuing from Barnette attractive as a practical matter, especially for those with the power to say what the conclusions will be.
But the same fluidity makes the "no orthodoxy" position quite useless
as a way of understanding what the constitutional norms actually are
or should be.
IV. A PLEA OF NECESSITY
Proponents of a "no orthodoxy" position occasionally acknowledge that in some situations, government cannot avoid endorsing
some beliefs and rejecting others; and having conceded as much,
rather than draw the most natural conclusion-namely, that for all its
allure the "no orthodoxy" position is simply not viable-they instead
make a dispensation from the prohibition for cases in which such
deviations are unavoidable. Kent Greenawalt provides an example.
(I use Greenawalt for this purpose precisely because he is a deservedly respected scholar in the field who, unlike justices and many
scholars, at least addresses this problem.)
As noted above,
Greenawalt embraces the idea that "government may not make
determinations of religious truth."75 But he also notices one of the
difficulties discussed above: government cannot avoid determining
that some religious beliefs are not true. Greenawalt gives examples:
A court orders a state to desegregate its schools, the country goes
to war, educational funds are made available equally to men and

women. The government has implicitly rejected religious notions
that (1) God wishes rigid racial separation, (2) all killing in war violates God's commandments, (3) all women should occupy them-

75. Greenawalt, supra note 22, at 197.
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selves with domestic tasks. A vast array of laws and policies
simi76
larly imply the incorrectnessof particularreligious views.

One might think that this concession would prompt doubts about
the original proposition-that "government may not make determinations of religious truth." But in a legal culture in which a Barnettestyle "no orthodoxy" position is virtually axiomatic, it seems that
proposition is beyond suspicion. So instead, Greenawalt treats the
"vast array" of inconsistencies he has just noticed as a minor inconvenience, disposing of the problem in a paragraph. In that paragraph
he makes-or at least summarily suggests-four basic points, three of
which involve distinctions discussed above. First, although the
governmental actions that Greenawalt has described concededly
reject particular religious beliefs, they do not affirm any religious
beliefs. 77 As discussed, however, this distinction between negative
and positive prescriptions can carry little or no weight, nor does the
doctrine developed by the Supreme Court authorize any such doublestandard. 78 Second, the decisions mentioned might be adopted on a
variety of different grounds, which might be either religious or
secular. 79 As discussed, however, the same might be said of virtually
any governmental decision-even including, for example, a decision
favoring "Christianity." Third, the rejection of religious beliefs is
merely implicit, not explicit. 8° But, as discussed above, it is not clear
that this distinction is workable, and even less clear why it should
81
have constitutional significance.
Finally, and primarily, Greenawalt relies on a plea of necessity.
"Since this implicit rejection of religious views is inevitable," he
argues, "it cannot be unconstitutional."2

This last point (which

assumes that the Constitution cannot have a tragic dimension) might
be debated, but for present purposes let us grant Greenawalt's point.
76. Id. at 199 (emphasis added). For further similar examples, see Edward B. Foley,
Political Liberalism and Establishment Clause Jurisprudence,43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 963,
973-78 (1993).
77. "The state's action, by itself, does not assert the correctness of the religious reason."
Greenawalt, supra note 22, at 199 (emphasis added). As discussed above, of course, many
public pronouncements do affirm particular religious beliefs.
78. The case law consistently says that government must be "neutral" toward religion, and
must avoid either endorsing or disapprovingof religion.
79. Greenawalt, supra note 22, at 199 ("The desegregation order, for example, could be
supported by a secular view that all human beings are inherently equal or by a religious view
that in God's eyes all people are equal.").
80. Id. (describing "this implicit rejection of religious views").
81. See supra Section III.B.
82. Greenawalt, supra note 22, at 199 (emphasis added).
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The curious position that results from this reasoning now looks
something like this:
(1) Government is constitutionally forbidden to make
determinations of the truth of religious propositions.
(2) In a "vast array" of situations, government must make (at
least negative) determinations of the truth of religious
propositions.
(3) Therefore, government must not make determinations of the
truth of religious propositions except when it must do so.
This is at best an awkward constitutional position. And it is
worth noting how the usual conventions of reasoning are suspended.
Normally, the statement of counterexamples or nonconforming
instances leads to the rejection or at least the re-examination of the
original argument or premise. In this case, proposition (2) acknowledges the existence of counterexamples - numerous counterexamples,
it seems-to proposition (1).83 So one might imagine the following
argument, that uses for its premises only assertions that Greenawalt
makes:
(la) If government cannot avoid performing a particular
function, then that function cannot be unconstitutional.
(2a) Government cannot avoid making (at least negative)
determinations of religious truth in a "vast array" of cases.
(3a) Therefore, (at least negative) governmental determinations
of religious truth cannot be unconstitutional.
(This conclusion might then prompt a discussion of whether there is
any good constitutional reason for letting the government make
negative but not affirmative determinations of religious truth-an
issue considered earlier.)
In Greenawalt's presentation, however, this variation of the argument is not considered. On the contrary, the concession of proposition (2) does not lead to the rejection or even the rethinking of
proposition (1). Instead, in a move typical of First Amendment
83. Or at least it does so on Greenawalt's assumption that what is unavoidable cannot be
constitutionally forbidden.
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jurisprudence in general, Greenawalt simply tries to hold incompatible propositions together in a sort of adverse and unstable union.
The difficulty might be manageable if the unavoidable departures from the "no orthodoxy" position were minor and exceptional.
First Amendment jurisprudence might then be like the person who
resolves to be totally honest, but in practice claims an occasional
indulgence for a "little white lie." But as Greenawalt admits, deviations from the "no orthodoxy" rule are at least implicit in "a vast
array of laws and policies"; indeed, it is arguable that every law or
policy constitutes a potential deviation (though many such deviations
may not be offensive to anyone, and hence may not provoke controversy or litigation84). So in reality the course we are consigned to by
Barnette is more comparable to the plight of the person who solemnly
vows to practice a strict fast from all food during Lent; and when
questioned about his regular appearances in the cafeteria, he explains: "Oh, yes, I'm standing by my vow. It's very important to me.
You need to understand: I'm only eating these meals because it's
necessary for me to do so-to live, you know, and to function. If I
need to eat, it can't be wrong, can it?" Well, perhaps not, but....
V. "AND" FOR "OR": TOWARD A MORE FORTHRIGHT
JURISPRUDENCE

The previous two sections have considered various attempts to
salvage the "no orthodoxy" position, either by qualifying it or by
excusing inevitable departures from it; and I have argued that these
attempts are unpersuasive. The result has been a jurisprudence of
deception and inconsistency -one that sporadically strikes down the
occasional governmental act or pronouncement for violating the
Barnette prohibitions while more often winking at (or explaining
away or, most often, simply not noticing) massive transgressions. It is
little wonder that First Amendment jurisprudence-as well as governmental practice as regulated by that jurisprudence-has become
renowned for its haphazard quality.
So, could we have a more satisfactory and honest jurisprudence?
In principle it seems we could, though we might have to sacrifice our
self-gratifying pretensions of neutrality and complete inclusiveness.
We could, that is, forthrightly admit that government does, must,
84. For example, there do not appear to be any Aztec representatives bringing challenges
to murder laws. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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always has, and always will "prescribe what shall be orthodox"-not
in all matters of "politics, nationalism, religion, and other matters of
opinion," to be sure, but in many. A political community will affirm
those (perceived) truths that provide its reason for being,.., and also
those (perceived) truths that support the particular political decisions
it makes,.., and probably also those (perceived) truths that it and its
citizens believe to be especially important or necessary or part of a
good and acceptable life. 85 And if the community is pluralistic, then

of course not all citizens will agree with the (perceived) truths so
affirmed. With wisdom and a good measure of luck, such public
affirmations conceivably might, to paraphrase Lincoln, satisfy some of
the citizens all of the time, and all of the citizens some of the time; but
they will surely not win the assent of all of the citizens all of the time.

So the distinctive mark of a free society-or at least one distinctive
mark-is not that it will refrain from believing anything, or from

affirming what it believes, but rather that it will refrain from coercing
professions of belief from unwilling citizens.86
Barnette says as much; or rather it would say something like this
if it were amended to replace the "or" with an "and." The jurisprudence that would result from this revised understanding would focus

the attention of jurists and scholars on the question of coercion
(which of course is hardly a purely empirical, "yes or no" matter).
What sorts of governmental actions impermissibly "force" citizens to
"confess" to orthodoxies that they do not hold (or at least that they
do not wish to confess)? This is not an easy question to answer, as the
clashing "coercion" opinions by Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia in
Lee v. Weisman 87 make clear. If coercion is defined too narrowly,

conscience will not be well protected; if it is defined too broadly (so
that, for example, any governmental endorsement of a controversial
85. Comments at the conference, including Professor Shiffrin's commentary, lead me to
emphasize that this statement is offered merely as a generic description of the sorts of things
that any government or political community is likely to prescribe. The present Essay does not
pretend either to offer any particular substantive orthodoxy for the country or even to propose
constitutional criteria that should govern the formulation of such an orthodoxy. To put the
point differently, the purpose of this Essay is to argue that the Barnette "no prescription"
criterion does not work; it is not to offer some other orthodoxy, or some other criterion for
establishing an orthodoxy, as a replacement for Barnette. I understand Shiffrin's comments in
essence to propose a version of Millian liberalism as the orthodoxy. Well, Millian liberalism is
surely one candidate; for present purposes my only point (and I am not sure that Shiffrin
disagrees) is that it should be recognized for what it is-that is, a proposed orthodoxy that the
state would embrace and "prescribe."
86. For a cogent and provocative essay along these lines, see Walker, supra note 52.
87. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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belief is deemed coercive), then we will be back facing the same
problems that the "no orthodoxy" position encounters. But the
question of coercion is at least one that is not inherently misleading or
disingenuous; it does not require us to pretend that government is not
doing what in fact it is doing (and cannot avoid doing).
It may be helpful to give a couple of examples of how this altered
jurisprudence might affect our discourse. My first example comes
from the pages of this journal. In an essay discussing Stephen Macedo's version of political liberalism, Michael McConnell criticizes
Macedo for supporting what McConnell calls a "new establishmentarianism." 88 McConnell defines "establishmentarianism" as "[t]he
idea that a nation should be animated by a set of common values and
beliefs, backed by governmental authority." He acknowledges that
such "establishments," as he calls them, "can range from highly
coercive (compelling affirmation of belief and persecuting dissenters)
to tolerant"; 89 but in his view either kind of "establishment"-the
coercive kind or the noncoercive, tolerant kind-is incompatible with
liberal democracy. 90 Criticizing Macedo for maintaining that "'[t]his
society stands for certain common values[,]"' McConnell describes at
greater length the position he finds objectionable:
Contrary to what is usually thought, [Macedo believes] liberal
states may espouse an orthodoxy about the good life. So long as
they do not engage in outright "coercion," they may use "subtle"
and "gentle" instruments of government power-including taxation
and selective funding-to promote their view of patterns of good
citizenship. 91
McConnell's version of "nonestablishmentarianism" is consistent
with the natural, broad reading of Barnette. But as the foregoing
discussion has suggested, that position is hopelessly quixotic, and
inconsistent with the way governments in this country have in fact
behaved. Does McConnell believe in the sort of "value-free" education in public schools that has long come to be recognized as spurious

88. Michael W. McConnell, The New Establishmentarianism,75 CHm.-KENT L. REV. 453

(2000).

89. Id. at 453.
90. McConnell seems ambivalent about whether a tolerant establishment is forbidden by
the U.S. Constitution, but he is more confident that any sort of establishment is inconsistent
with liberal democracy. Id. at 469-70.
91. Id. at 467-68.
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(and that McConnell's own writings effectively show to be an illusion)?92
If not, doesn't candor compel the admission that the public
schools have in fact been "promot[ing] their [our?] view of patterns of
good citizenship"? And if the nation cannot be "animated by a set of
common values and beliefs," then what are we to make of, say, the
Declaration of Independence, with its solemn affirmation of "selfevident truths" as the basis of our independent nationhood? And
how is government (or its officials) to answer if we citizens ask why
the political community has any claim on our loyalty and respect?
Plead the Fifth?
Conversely, Macedo's general position, as described by McConnell, seems not only attractive but inevitable. This is not to say, of
course, that the specific substantive orthodoxy advocated by Macedo
is the correct one. But the cogent response is not to complain that
Macedo thinks "[t]his society stands for certain common values" or
that he would have the political community stand for something, but
rather to consider or criticize the substance of what Macedo would
have the community stand for. 93
A second example is provided by the Ninth Circuit's recent controversial decision declaring the words "under God" in the Pledge of
Allegiance unconstitutional. 94 Quoting the Barnette passage, the
court ruled that these words endorsed religion and in effect prescribed an orthodoxy.9 Conversely, the concurring and dissenting
opinion by Judge Fernandez conceded that the words endorsed
religion but argued that two short words in the Pledge were "de
minimis" and should not be removed. 96
This is of course the sort of debate that the Barnette regime mandates, but it is also bound to be a fruitless and less than candid debate.

92. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U. L.
REV. 146, 162 (1986):
If the public school day and all its teaching is strictly secular, the child is likely to
learn the lesson that religion is irrelevant to the significant things of this world, or at
least that the spiritual realm is radically separate and distinct from the temporal.
However unintended, these are lessons about religion. They are not "neutral." Studious silence on a subject that parents may say touches all of life is an eloquent refutation.
93. In fairness, it must be said that McConnell criticizes Macedo on these terms as wellpersuasively, in my view.
94. Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002).
95. Id. at 609.
96. Id. at 612-15 (Fernandez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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By any fair reading, the words "under God" in a state-sponsored
pledge do endorse religion, at least in a generic theistic variety; in that
sense they "prescribe what shall be orthodox." And if the words are
merely "de minimis," or of no real significance, it would be hard to
explain the uproar that the Ninth Circuit's decision provoked. At the
same time, as discussed, the government will-inevitably, and in a
variety of ways- be prescribing an orthodoxy (or a complex variety of
orthodoxies): the Pledge itself, which the Ninth Circuit did not enjoin,
does that (as does the Ninth Circuit's own opinion). Moreover, those
orthodoxies will inevitably have implications, sometimes favorable
and sometimes unfavorable, for a whole spectrum of religious beliefs.
In this case, the forcible removal of the words "under God" may lead
some citizens to believe that the judiciary and perhaps the revised
Pledge are hostile to religion; but even if that is not so, the excised
Pledge clearly if implicitly rejects or at least marginalizes the viewundoubtedly held by many citizens and easily discernible in, say, the
Declaration of Independence, and memorably propounded by Justice
Douglas in a moment of reckless lucidity 97-that the nation and its
rights and constitutional system are grounded in a religious foundation.
So there is no getting around two facts: first, that with or without
the words "under God," the Pledge of Allegiance contains affirmations of beliefs that amount to an orthodoxy; and second, that however those beliefs are formulated, some citizens will find them
objectionable and probably alienating. Barnette, decided before the
words "under God" were added to the Pledge, recognized both facts.
And once those facts are acknowledged, it becomes apparent that
neither the Newdow majority's argument (basically, that the words
"under God" affirm something that some citizens do not accept) nor
the dissent's argument (basically, that the words do not amount to
any substantial affirmation) can provide a plausible and adequate
basis for resolving the case. Having disposed of those nondispositive
claims, we might then go to consider whether there is anything else
about the Pledge and the way it is practiced in the schools that
offends the Constitution.

97. "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
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CONCLUSION

"If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation. ...
The phrase marks a question of identity and self-interpretation
that any political community must sometimes ask itself. What is the
essential character of our community? In what ways are we distinctive-in what ways are we different from other communities?
Through much of our own history, this sort of question has been
asked with an implicit contrasting reference to the nations and
kingdoms from which Americans departed to come to this land. How
are we different than, say, the English nation? Typically, these
nations had maintained religious "establishments," and that fact often
figured in our efforts to distinguish ourselves. In the mid-twentieth
century it became natural to contemplate a further comparison (and
one that did not as conspicuously implicate "religion"): how are we
different from the authoritarian regimes of Nazi Germany and Soviet
Russia?
Barnette unmistakably reflects an attempt, with such comparisons
in the background, to consider this question of identity or selfinterpretation. What sort of community are we? What is the "fixed
star in our constitutional constellation" that makes us the distinctive
community we are?
One possible answer picks up on the fact that other regimes to
which we often contrast ourselves have been committed-publicly
committed-to some set of beliefs. They might be committed to a
"religion," as in the historical comparisons, or to an "ideology," as in
the mid-twentieth century comparisons; but in any case they are
publicly committed to some sort of "orthodoxy." And it seems to
follow from this way of framing the comparison that if our community
is distinctive, its distinction lies in the absence of any public commitment to any orthodoxy.
This is a tempting interpretation, for reasons that have been
noted. But for other, more potent reasons that have also been
discussed, it is not a viable position that ours or any other community
ever has followed or ever could follow. Consequently, this interpretation, if legally embraced, virtually ensures an unstable jurisprudence
and a delusional discourse.
Fortunately, there is another possible interpretation. Perhaps
our community is distinctive not because it does not believe anything,
or does not affirm its beliefs; its constitutive aspiration, rather, is to be
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open and free in allowing those central beliefs to be formulated
through ongoing debate, to treat such formulations as provisional,
and even once such beliefs have been provisionally formulated to
allow for and indeed to cherish dissent.98 So our community refrains-or at least this is its ideal-from coercing citizens to accept
beliefs to which they do not assent.
The stirring rhetoric in Barnette might be invoked in favor of either of these interpretations; or at least it could support either interpretation with the alteration of a conjunction. Deliberately or not,
Justice Jackson chose the conjunction "or," and thereby cast the
weight of his historic opinion behind the first, "no orthodoxy" interpretation. This is a community, he mused, that is distinctive because.., because it is committed to no orthodoxy, no "right
opinions." Publicly, as a community, it stands for nothing. Jackson's
choice was a mistake-one that did not and could not honestly
convey even his own considered views. It is time the mistake was
rectified by changing a word. An and for an or.

98. See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 86109 (1990).

